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FETISHISM AND FANTASY IN BENNETT’S 
THE OLD COUNTRY AND SINGLE SPIES
Larry Langford
California State University, Fresno
The difference between him and the other boys at such a 
time was that they knew it was make-believe, while to 
him make-believe and true were exactly the same thing.
—J. M. Barrie, Peter Pan
Bron: He’s just a lost boy.
Hilary: This isn’t Never Never Land.
—Alan Bennett, The Old Country
One of Freud’s fundamental insights is that the human psyche 
develops through a process by which the individual confronts and seeks 
to compensate for the frustration of his or her desires. Through the 
whole spectrum of human activities, from the destructively neurotic to 
the healthy, we try to come to terms with the fact that some of our 
desires have not been, and perhaps never will be, satisfied. Sometimes, 
however, if the object of desire remains unattainable, we compensate by 
means of a substitute object or activity which, though never totally 
adequate, at least affords a certain sense of satisfaction and enables us to 
carry on with our lives.
This process of imaginative supplementation and compensation is 
a defining characteristic of Alan Bennett’s plays on the Cambridge 
spies, The Old Country and Single Spies. Although dealing with a real 
life drama of espionage, betrayal, and defection, Bennett’s concerns are 
not those of a Le Carre, whose characters show a world-weariness bom 
of long involvement in Cold War violence and deception. Instead, 
Bennett gives us three protagonists whose usefulness in the shadow war 
of espionage has long passed, and who now live unrepentantly, though 
not unremorsefully, with the consequences of their political 
commitment. Rather than the intrigue and adventure of Cold War 
espionage, Bennett’s plays focus on the dynamics of desire. Within the 
context of the British spy scandal involving Guy Burgess, Anthony 
Blunt, Kim Philby, and Donald Maclean, Bennett examines how human 
beings compensate for frustration and disappointment by endowing 
certain objects and activities with the power to satisfy otherwise 
unfulfilled desires and needs.
Whenever desire, whether sexual or otherwise, depends upon such 
substitutions for its fulfillment, it utilizes the practice of fetishism.
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Thus, Bennett’s spies, whatever else they may be, are in this strict 
sense fetishists because whether as defectors in exile or as moles in 
English aristocratic and cultural circles, they struggle to maintain a 
sense of self-identity through a lifelong involvement in or 
preoccupation with objects and activities closely associated with the 
ideals of English tradition and culture. Their sense of identity, in other 
words, does not simply evolve out of their own self-consciousness by 
some act of will but requires the reinforcement of certain personally 
significant objects. Although their personalities differ sharply, 
Bennett’s spies harbor a desiring fantasy to retain a sense of identity 
that differs significantly from their publicly acknowledged roles as 
traitors; consequently, certain objects in their lives become the vehicles 
of this desire, without which the sense of personal justification that 
each so values would remain an impossibility.
The term “fetish” might seem problematic in this context, for it 
has a number of associations, some quite negative. In its association 
with certain religious practices, the fetish is an object which actually 
possesses spiritual powers. Not merely a symbol, the religious fetish 
embodies, at least in part, the divine being it represents, so that 
believers do not distinguish the cult object from the god they worship. 
In pyschoanalysis and Marxism, the term takes on decidedly negative 
overtones, but in each it designates a compensatory practice which 
directly results from a type of trauma—individual in the one case, social 
in the other.
Freud defines the sexual fetish as a substitute “for the woman’s 
[mother’s] phallus which the little boy once believed in and does not 
wish to forgo.”1 In an attempt to allay his own castration anxieties, 
the fetishist relies on an object which can substitute for the lost phallus 
of the female. As such, the fetish “remains a token of triumph over the 
threat of castration and a safeguard against it” (Freud 200). For Marx, 
the commodity fetish provides one means by which the bourgeoise 
safeguards its political and economic ascendency. As with the power of 
neurosis, the power of the bourgeoisie in part depends upon its not 
being recognized for what it is, an exploitative and oppressive class. It 
must, therefore, mask the social relationships it fosters by making 
them seem other than they are. With the commodity fetish, products 
come to possess a value that is independent of their material 
composition or of the social relationship which made their production 
possible. As in the case of religion, where “the products of the human 
brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own,”2 
the commodity takes on a life of its own by seeming naturally to
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embody a value which substitutes for the value of the human labor 
which went into producing it. For both Marx and Freud, therefore, the 
fetish becomes “an object of superstition, fantasy, and obsessive 
behavior...the antithesis of the scientific image, epitomizing 
irrationality in both its crudity of representational means and its use in 
superstitious rituals.”3
Bennett’s spies, however, are not fetishists in any of these specific 
senses. Rather than an instance of psychological or political aberration, 
their fetishism entails what Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit call “a 
fundamental adventure in human seeing,” in which an object becomes 
the objective correlative of a desiring fantasy.4 Bersani and Dutoit 
define fantasy as “a relation of desire to an internalized absent object,” 
which in turn makes a desiring fantasy “the inexact repetition of a 
remembered pleasure” (66). Because of this inexactness, they continue:
desire is always on the move: always somewhere “to the 
side of’ the experience it presumably wants to revive, 
desire continuously changes one image for another and is 
thus intrinsically an unending process of displacements 
and substitutions (66).
For Bersani and Dutoit, therefore, the fetishist is always faced with an 
unresolvable paradox in that the fetish object denotes the continued 
frustration of the very desire it is meant to satisfy. The sexual fetishist, 
for example, does not direct his desire toward the fetish objects 
themselves but toward that other object, the woman’s lost penis, 
“whose absence they both designate and deny” (67). By attempting to 
compensate for the woman’s perceived castration, the fetishist 
repeatedly emphasizes the fact of that castration and thus the possibility 
of his own. This predicament means that “fetishism depends on an 
ambiguous negation of the real, a negation which mobilizes the 
desiring imagination” (71). By engaging in the compensatory act of 
fetishism, the sexual fetishist must implicitly recognize the unbridgable 
gap between the fetish object and that which it designates. In other 
words, he always finds himself in a double bind because “[w]hat he 
wished to replace was never there, and the replacement never resembled 
the missing penis. No image of desiring fantasy ever reproduces the 
object (or image) which it may be designed to replace” (71). The 
desiring fantasy never finds fulfillment because of the unavoidable 
inadequacy of any fetish object as a substitute.
Bersani’s and Dutoit’s analysis of fetishism is particularly useful 
because it may provide, as they themselves say, “the model for all
3
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substitutive formations in which the first term of the equation is lost, 
or unlocatable” (71). To claim that Bennett’s spies are fetishists, 
therefore, is simply to say that they desire something which they do not 
have and perhaps never had, and that they are trying to compensate for 
this lack through a process of substitution and displacement. As we 
shall see, they endow certain objects and concepts with a special power 
to fulfill individual needs, so that more than being mere symbols, these 
objects become for them the actual repository for certain indispensable 
meanings and values.
The choice of these fetishes in Bennett’s plays, however, is not 
idiosyncratic. True, any object or concept might possibly become a 
fetish for an individual’s desiring fantasy, but the choice of fetishes 
tends to occur in cultural patterns.5 With Hilary and Burgess in 
particular, we see a pattern in their choice of fetish objects which 
vividly illustrates the dilemma Bersani and Dutoit believe confronts all 
fetishists: the attempt to replace what was never there with something 
categorically different from what is believed lost. Such attempts 
structure the lives of these two characters and make possible their firm 
commitment to an idea of English culture despite their betrayal of 
England’s social and political institutions. That is, having substituted 
the Soviet Union for Great Britain in their political loyalties, they find 
no corresponding desire to supplant English cultural values with 
Russian or even recognizably communist values. But if England is 
“the dustbin,” as Hilary says, then why this refusal to let go of it?6 
What England did they betray, and toward what England do they now 
maintain an insistent personal loyalty?
In one sense, of course, Hilary and Burgess feel a poignant 
nostalgia which aptly illustrates Oscar Wilde’s dictum that the only 
thing worse than not getting what one wants is getting it. “It is a trap, 
this haven,” says Hilary (14), indicating the limited satisfactions that 
ideological integrity sometimes offers. For both Hilary and Burgess, 
life as defectors denies them as much or even more than it offers, so 
that the political necessity of their decisions becomes an increasingly 
meager compensation for the sense of loneliness and loss both feel. “It 
seemed the right thing to do at the time” is the strongest defense 
Burgess can offer for actions of the profoundest personal and national 
consequences.7 So both, not surprisingly, turn for relief to perhaps the 
most pervasive of fetishisms, nostalgia, which seeks to keep the past 
alive by preserving its objects and concepts. They do not harbor a 
personal nostalgia, however. They do not wistfully long for childhood 
or lost youth. Instead they long for an idealized England which, in
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Hilary’s case, means an England of literary achievement, tea shops, and 
religious certainty, while for Burgess it means gentlemen’s clubs, 
stylish dress, and the gossip and glamour of celebrities. These versions 
of England constitute for each a desiring fantasy for something that did 
not, in fact, exist in the England each felt he must betray. “You see,” 
says Burgess, “I can say I love London. I can say I love England. But 
I can’t say I love my country. I don’t know what that means” (29). If 
the meaning of love for one’s country remains obscure, its 
consequences do not. As with the sexual fetishist who attempts to 
resupply the woman with the phallus she never had, Hilary and Burgess 
live an ongoing attempt to validate their fantasies of England, an 
England unlocatable in history because it exists only in the objects and 
ideals that clutter their lives.
In The Old Country, Hilary’s fetishism primarily finds expression 
in the decor of his home. Although he and his wife, Bron, live under 
constant surveillance in a government supplied house in the Russian 
countryside, Bennett nonetheless describes their home as “A very 
English scene” (9). English first editions clutter the stage and Elgar 
plays on the gramophone (with Vaughn Williams as the only musical 
alternative). Hilary describes the weather as “a day for Burke, not for 
Hobbes” (11), and facetiously suggests to Bron that he might write a 
letter to the Times on the flight patterns of seagulls (11). Moreover, he 
comments on how much the countryside reminds him of Scotland (13). 
Overall, their home reflects Hilary’s passion for collecting souvenirs 
and bric-a-brac, an English pastime popular since the eighteenth 
century.8 Despite living in the Soviet Union, therfore, the couple 
resides in a deliberately fashioned island of Englishness.
In An Englishman Abroad, the first part of Single Spies, Burgess’s 
Moscow apartment reflects a similar, if more feeble, attempt to recreate 
an English atmosphere. English books overflow the bookshelves; he 
has funiture from his London home; and he repeatedly plays his only 
English language record, Jack Buchanan’s rendition of “Who Stole my 
Heart Away?” Like Hilary, his talk is also all of English life, though 
primarily gossip mongering about friends and acquaintances; and 
whereas Hilary just surrounds himself with fetishes, Burgess literally 
covers himself with them. His desire for a new suit of English clothes, 
however, has less to do with style or utility than with his attempt to 
recoup a sense of identity which exile and isolation have seriously 
undermined. So instead of recreating the English house as extensively 
as Hilary does, he recreates himself as the proper Englishman. Behind 
this wish lies the irony that there has always been something decidedly 
un-English about him. “My trouble is I lack what the English call
5
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character. By which they mean the power to refrain. Appetite. The 
English never like that, do they?” (28). Still, despite Burgess’s 
perceived inability to embody the so-called English character, he feels 
the need to affirm his connection with it by donning its trappings. As 
he tells Coral Browne, he “never cared tuppence for clothes before” (24) 
because he always had charm, but Soviet culture has proved resistent to 
his English charm, primarily because it depends so much on his use of 
the English language:
Coral: You still have charm...
Burgess: But not here. Not for them. For charm one 
needs words. I have no words. And, short of my 
clothes, no class. I am “The Englishman.” (24)
Isolated from his native language, Burgess’s identity deteriorates 
into a shadow of its former self. To counteract this process, he has his 
London clothiers literally build another Burgess in the image of that 
self. As in the refrain of the Gilbert and Sullivan song which Burgess 
sings, “For he might have been a Roosian...He remains an 
Englishman” (36), his ability to do so comes not from any innate sense 
of identity, but from objects which he has endowed with the power to 
compensate for what he otherwise cannot possess. Isolated from 
English contacts and the English language, both Hilary and Burgess 
must rely on fetish objects in order to live with the trauma of having 
lost some sense of personal identity when they left the country of their 
birth.
Their propensity to fetishize, however, does not restrict itself to 
objects. It also entails certain concepts and abstractions through which 
they try to recover the idealized England they feel they lost at the 
moment of their defection. Each cherishes memories of England but 
only of a specific type. They do not harken back to the England which 
they betrayed, the England of monarchy, class privilege, empire, and 
capitalism, but to a fantasy England which remains enclosed, 
comfortable, familiar, and permanent. “This is heaven...A Wendy 
House,” says Veronica when she sees the type of English home Hilary 
and Bron have established for themselves in the Soviet Union (27); but 
it is English only in the Never Never Land sense of fantasy and 
imagination. Rather than being a representation of England as it was or 
is, the house represents England the way Hilary would have it be. As 
with the sexual fetishist’s reaction to the supposed castration of the 
woman, both Hilary and Burgess try to preserve a vision of the past as 
it supposedly existed before the trauma of separation. This need
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accounts for their hostility toward any changes that occur in England. 
Whether it concerns alterations in the liturgy of the Church of England, 
the closing of tea shops, or the elimination of libraries in Army and 
Navy Stores, to which he exclaims, “Is there no end to your lunacy?” 
(48), Hilary dislikes anything that differentiates England from his 
fantasy of it. “Do I want the old place to change? I don’t think so. I 
have left it. It must stay the same or there is no point in having come 
away” (30).
Burgess shares these attitudes. With his fantasy of England locked 
in the London social scene of the 1940’s, he vainly questions Coral 
about radio programs, poets, actors, and other personalities whom she 
does not know. When reminded that London has changed since he left, 
he angrily asks, “Why? I don’t want it to change. Why does anybody 
want to change? They’ve no business changing it. The fools. You 
should stop them from changing it. Band together” (29). Such 
reactions by Hilary and Burgess undoubtedly combine sentimental 
nostalgia with rank hypocrisy, especially because their outrage entails 
the wish to preserve a status quo they have already betrayed. In terms 
of fetishism, however, these attitudes and concerns have an importance 
equal to that of fetish objects. They offer each man a means of 
regaining what he in fact never possessed, but, again, only in such a 
way that affirms their inability to actually compenstate for such a loss. 
As such, these fantasies of England constitute genuine fetishes.
I have not yet mentioned Blunt because his relationship to the 
fetish object differs in many ways from that of Hilary and Burgess. As 
a spy who remained successfully undercover for decades, he never had to 
experience the trauma of defection and the debilitating effects of being 
separated from his language and culture. If he avoided these difficulties, 
however, he lived under another which never troubled Hilary or Burgess. 
By defecting, they at least relieved themselves of the burden of lying 
and deception. They could from that time onwards live openly, even if 
ignominously, as traitors to their country. Blunt never, until the end of 
his life, found relief from this burden, and in Bennett’s play, he acutely 
feels the weight of it. Blunt’s dilemma differs from that of the other 
two because he does not feel the need to regain what he has forfeited. 
Instead, he must protect what he has always had, the respect of the 
highest cultural and aristocratic circles in England.
In A Question of Attribution, the second part of Single Spies, 
Bennett deals with the theme of fetishism on a level of still greater 
complexity. For Hilary and Burgess, the use of fetishes is a fairly 
straight-forward affair in that they experience a lack and use objects, 
however inadequately, to compensate for it. Blunt, however, uses
7
Langford: Fetishism and Fantasy in Bennett’s The Old Country and Single Spi
Published by eGrove, 1995
368 BENNETT’S PLAYS
fetishes to forestall any such experience. He wants to avoid not only 
exile and isolation, but also the inevitable disparagement and 
condemnation, and his tool for doing so is art.
The fetishizing of the art object appears to some degree in each of 
Bennett’s plays on the Cambridge spies. As fetishes, Hilary’s first 
editions, Burgess’s music, and Blunt’s art works ensure that questions 
of national loyalty and political commitment occur within the context 
of aesthetic value. As subject matter for a play, the story of the 
Cambridge spies presents many dramatic possibilities, yet these are not 
history plays in any ordinary sense. Instead of historical facts, Bennett 
focuses on a process of imaginative compensation that emphasizes 
interpretation over representation. Privileging interpretation is the 
strategy of Blunt’s life as he attempts to influence how others interpret 
his political decisions. Rather than have the facts of his life indicate he 
is a traitor, a fraud, and a liar, he wants them to indicate something 
much different, much more ambiguous.
This emphasis upon interpretation gives art its thematic 
importance in these plays; for if fetishism is a type of fantasizing, it is 
also a type of interpretation. Not only is fetishism a way of making 
use of an object, it is a way of ascribing value and meaning to it as 
well. The presence of aesthetic issues in these plays means that a 
particular type of interpretation is taking place. Interpretation, of 
course, has an indispensable place in many disciplines, but one does not 
interpret a work of art in precisely the same way as a scientific or 
historical fact. Aesthetic interpretation thrives on ambiguity, but 
science and history try to dispel it as much as possible. This difference 
explains why art rather than science or history preoccupies Bennett’s 
spies. Whatever regrets they may have about past actions or present 
circumstances, none of them willingly accepts condemnation for what 
they have done. This refusal involves a process of self-validation that 
is vital to each of them. They refuse to let the label of traitor trivialize 
their lives by simplifying the meaning of their existence.
In the case of Hilary, the vagaries of interpetation are what will 
facilitate his transition back into English society. Although his 
participation in a spy exchange is not completely voluntary, his return 
to England will mean only a brief stay in prison and then complete 
social rehabilitation. Because both the British and Soviet governments 
need his cooperation to make the exchange, the facts of who he is and 
what he has done lose all moral importance. “That is what you have to 
do to be cast out,” says Hilary. “Murder children. Nothing else quite 
does the trick, because any other crime will always find you friends” 
(53). When faced with the demands of political expediency, the
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interpretive ambiguity of aesthetics finds its place in history and 
morality as well. When Bron reminds them that people, even friends, 
died because of Hilary’s actions, Duff responds with the rationalization 
that
To talk of guilt in a world where the purchase of an 
orange...is fraught with implications...is to talk of the 
air we breathe...So let there be no talk of guilt at this 
juncture. As soon talk of cause and effect. (59)
The reference to cause and effect is significant because it reminds us of 
how the exactitude of science and history differs from the interpretive 
demands of art. For the spy exchange to have any legitimacy, Hilary 
must appear morally redeemable, and that can only occur if one does not 
insist on sharply remembering his past deeds. As Hilary himself says, 
in response to the suggestion that he take up writing upon his return to 
England, “Art. The ineffable. The role of redeemer. Become an order 
out of chaos merchant” (44). But, of course, any sense of order is no 
longer dependent upon the indisputable existence of facts but upon the 
mode of interpretation within which one places them. Hilary reminds us 
that just as the communists of the 1930’s could become the Christians 
of the 1940’s, almost anything can move, however vaguely, “toward its 
antithesis” (61). This interpretive move will save Hilary from the 
merciless precision of factual analysis. Like a work of art, he will 
become so shrouded in ambiguities that it will be equally impossible to 
insist on any definitive explanation of who he is.
In other words, Hilary will be able to accomplish the very thing to 
which Blunt aspires in A Question of Attribution. In the two one-act 
plays of Single Spies, Bennett has in effect divided Hilary’s character so 
that with Burgess we see that side of Hilary that longs for England, and 
with Blunt the side that relishes ambiguities as a means of self-defense 
and self-justification. Thus, the fetishism of art to which Bennett 
alludes in The Old Country and An Englishman Abroad assumes a 
central role in A Question of Attribution. Almost every character in 
this third play analyzes art in some way, but Blunt does it differently 
than the rest. For the Queen, Colin, Chubb, and Phillips, art is 
primarily the domain of facts, so that understanding and appreciating art 
consists of knowing such things as names, dates, schools of art, the 
construction of frames, Titian’s age, established interpretations of 
allegories, or Rembrandt’s attitude toward dogs. Blunt does not dispute 
the importance of such issues in the study of art, but his approach 
emphasizes that the essence of an art work resides in the ineffability of
9
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one’s personal response to it. Even though he tends to be cold in his 
personal relations, Blunt can feel, he says, “ravished, sometimes” (42) 
by a work of art.
The importance of the fetish in this play emerges in the distinction 
between these two approaches to art. Whereas the other characters want 
to understand art in terms of fixed meanings and indisputable facts, 
Blunt wants to emphasize ambiguity and paradox so that the meaning 
remains indeterminant. Bennett’s play focuses, therefore, on a conflict 
between aesthetic interpretations rather than political ideologies, and 
this conflict evolves from the role of the historical fact in art criticism. 
By insisting on the primacy of fact in interpreting art, the other 
characters in effect make the fact into a fetish because they endow it 
with the power to ascribe and define identity in a way that overrides all 
other considerations. Just as the religious, sexual, and commodity 
fetishes empower certain objects in order to attain certain ends, so, too, 
do these characters empower the fact as a means of categorization that 
leaves no aesthetic questions unanswered. Blunt, however, resists this 
mode of interpretation, but he does so not only because of aesthetic 
principles. Instead, his motivations concern the assignment of guilt, or 
perhaps the avoidance of guilt, because, for Blunt, the role of the fact in 
art criticism bears directly on the question of whether or not he can find 
some way to exonerate himself for betraying his country and his class.
But how does the principle of factuality attain the status of a 
fetish? A fact, by definition, is an entity with power because it marks 
the demarcation between truth and falsehood. Non-factuality is the 
criterion by which we designate something as not true or not real. Of 
course, the factuality of certain data may be questioned or even denied, 
but only because they have been superseded by other facts. Within the 
empirical tradition, the fact has an epistemological status without equal 
because it is always the goal of investigation. The establishment of 
factuality marks a point of culmination in the search for knowledge. 
The fact might also be the beginning of this search, but only if it 
indicates the existence of other facts. We can say, therefore, that the 
fact contains within itself a teleology because it is the goal of the 
search for knowledge and the end of a certain type of interpretation. The 
relationship of one fact to others may still need interpreting, but not the 
fact itself. Once truth or reality has been established, interpretation 
ceases because anything requiring interpretation has an epistemological 
status still open to doubt, in that it may or may not be factual. 
Theories, hypotheses, opinions, and interpretations all make use of 
facts but do not have the certainty of one.
10
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The historical fact is especially problematic because in addition to 
being an instance of truth, it is also a form of representation. In 
history, the factuality of something does not exactly correspond with its 
material existence because the historical fact itself is almost always 
absent. Even more than the scientific fact, the historical fact exists 
primarily in language or images (records, documents, recollections, 
photographs) rather than in any sort of immediate presence, which in 
turn makes it more dependent upon the need for interpretation. But 
another reason for this dependence is history’s aspiration to do more 
than simply tell the who, when, where, and how of past events; it also 
seeks to tell why, and it does so by writing narratives of these events 
which will ascribe meaning and relative degrees of importance to them. 
As R. G. Collingwood notes, we cannot really understand past events 
until we make the imaginative attempt to think the thoughts of those 
who experienced them.9 Only then will we come to some 
understanding as to why they happened.
Blunt’s resistance to the fact as the foundation of art criticism, 
therefore, implicitly shows that he understands the usefulness of 
Collingwood’s mode of historical interpretation. The facts of his life 
are open and undeniable. He is a traitor and a spy who has betrayed and 
deceived his friends, family, and nation. He admits his guilt and 
willingly cooperates in the investigation into his activities. It is 
important for him, however, that others do not understand him solely in 
these terms because facts, as far as he is concerned, do not adequately 
define or explain him, just as they do not adequately explain a work of 
art.
Anthony Blunt himself wrote of the three problems which confront 
the art critic. The first is to define the influences which formed the 
artist, the second to define the artist’s achievement in technical terms, 
and the third to convey the critic’s personal reactions to the art work. 
“The great painters,” he continues,
lend themselves to all these kinds of analysis...But there 
remain certain minor men whose importance consists 
only in their being a link in the chain between greater 
men, and of them little can be said in any but the purely 
historical field. On the other hand, there are painters 
who are freaks; they may by some chance catch one’s 
fancy, but there is no great historical analysis to be 
applied to them.
11
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The utility of these distinctions can be extended to the character of 
Blunt in Bennett’s play. Chubb’s ongoing interrogation of Blunt really 
amounts to a historical analysis of him in order to determine the extent 
of his espionage activities and, if possible, to uncover other Soviet 
agents, especially the notorious fifth man who supposedly ran the 
whole spy network. “There is someone else,” says Chubb. “Someone 
behind you all. All the evidence points to it” (75). Yet the evidence 
(the facts) is exactly what Blunt attempts to undermine by showing that 
he has no useful knowledge of such activities. Chubb learns nothing 
from him but trivia or information so old as to be useless. The 
caginess of Bennett’s Blunt is his attempt to cast himself in the role of 
what Anthony Blunt called the painters “who are freaks,” that is, who 
cannot be analyzed, at least not by these criteria.
In his study of Picasso’s Guernica, Anthony Blunt writes that if in 
analyzing a painting one establishes
a parallel between a style of a modern artist and one 
practised in the past, it may help to define the new style, 
because we can often see the earlier style in a firmer 
perspective and may be able to analyse its origin and 
significance, since it is harder to view the more recent 
works objectively.11
What constitutes objectivity forms the crux of Bennett’s plays on the 
Cambridge spies. In A Question of Attribution, the issue of 
objectivity centers on how one reconciles the glaring contradictions of 
Blunt’s life. What is the connection between the Blunt associated with 
art, high culture, social privilege, and aristocracy, and the Blunt who 
acts as an agent for the proletarian revolution? What the character of 
Blunt wants especially to avoid is the conclusion that fraudulence 
explains this contradiction and that his whole life can be summarized by 
terms such as “liar” or “traitor.” That he has lied and has been a traitor 
are facts of his life which he does not deny, but he wants to put a 
different interpretation on them by draining them, as much as possible, 
of their negative connotations. Rather than submit to a straightforward 
positivism that would condemn him by virtue of identifying him in 
this way, Blunt wants to shroud himself in ambiguities so that 
alternative explanations become possible. Instead of being a fake, he 
wants to be, as he intimates to the Queen, “an enigma” (70).
For Blunt, insisting on the priority of facts leads to a 
misinterpretation of his life just as it does to works of art. To avoid 
such misinterpretation, there must be a balance between the certainty of
12
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historical events and the less accessible, and therefore less certain, 
psychological realities that lead to their occurrence. In effect, Blunt is 
asking that we understand the present by means of the past; but instead 
of past actions, he wants us to understand him by means of his past 
thoughts and motivations. He wants to be judged by a more enigmatic 
set of criteria so that he can, if not obtain pardon, at least escape 
condemnation.
This motivation constitutes the hidden agenda in his lecture on the 
theme of martyrdom in Renaissance art. Significantly, these paintings 
represent for him a world of ‘‘incongruous punishments” (42), where the 
saints “submit to their fate readily and without fuss” in a manner that 
makes one feel “that it is all very British” (43). “It is a world,” he 
continues, “in which time means nothing, the present overlaps the 
future, and did the saint but turn his head he would see his own 
martyrdom through the window” (43). Blunt’s interest in these 
paintings is psychologically significant because, like himself, all 
martyrs are traitors because they owe their allegiance to a higher, 
heavenly authority, and in order to maintain it, they must break faith 
with the state, even though that means suffering the ultimate 
punishment. Such is the way that Blunt interprets his life. In the 
1930’s, he felt he owed his allegiance to a cause greater than the British 
Crown and Parliament—the crusade against fascism. Outraged by his 
government’s willingness to let Spain fall victim to fascist aggression, 
he gave his allegiance to the only country which was actively aiding the 
Spanish Loyalists, the Soviet Union, and he continued to do so 
throughout the Second World War. Knowing full well the possible 
consequences of his actions, he nonetheless dedicated himself to the 
cause of the proletarian revolution in its fight against oppression and 
exploitation. In other words, rather than a Judas, he is a St. Lawrence, 
a martyr rather than a traitor, who has sacrificed himself for the sake of 
his principles.
Blunt’s lecture makes clear that he is trying to ameliorate the facts 
of his life by turning them into a metaphor. Why? Because, as 
always, facts are uncompromising. They are what they are, and these 
facts make him into nothing more than a traitor, a liar, and a fraud. 
That is, they do so unless he can show their insufficiency, unless he 
can defetishize them by showing how they do not have the power we 
assume they do, that they cannot give us the knowledge we demand of 
them. If the work of art is a fetish for Blunt insofar as it has the 
power, as he says, to ravish us, at the same time he wants to free it 
from a form of fetishism that would limit how we interpret it. In other 
words, A Question of Attribution gives us a conflict between fetishes.
13
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To give interpretive priority to such issues as social history, biography, 
and material composition demystifies art by locating its meaning, and 
therefore its power to affect us, in areas outside of the object itself. 
Chubb, the Queen, Colin, and others all defetishize art by subordinating 
its meaning to verifiable facts. To do so, however, they must fetishize 
facts and empower them in a way that Blunt feels is illegitimate. He 
wants to save art from the tyranny of facts because he wants to preserve 
its enigmatic but nonetheless real power over those who view it. For 
the art work to retain its power as a fetish, the historical fetish has first 
to lose its own.
Unlike the other characters, however, Blunt’s stake in this struggle 
between fetishes is personal, because if he can change the way they 
interpet art, he can change the way they interpret his life and actions. 
He wants both art and himself to be what the fact cannot contain and 
dominate. “But art has no goal,” he tells Chubb. “It evolves, but it 
does not necessarily progress...Different periods have different styles, 
different ways of seeing the world” (49). Indeed they do, but for Blunt 
this difference applies to politics as well as art and must be taken into 
consideration before any interpretation can be made. That is why he 
tells Chubb, “There isn’t any ‘hang of it.’ There isn’t a kit” (55), when 
it comes to interpreting art. Predetermined meanings and prescribed 
methodologies miss the point entirely. “You’re just carrying over the 
techniques of facile identification favored in your profession, into 
mine...where it isn’t quite like that. Appearances deceive. Art is 
seldom quite what it seems” (55). Neither, he hopes, is he, at least as 
far as his interpreters are concerned.
What he hopes for, instead, is the enigmatic moral of the artistic 
forgery, a work that can make no claims to authenticity but which may 
still retain a certain historical and even aesthetic significance. As long 
as he is an enigma, he requires further interpretation. The final verdict 
cannot be brought in because the facts of his case will not explain him 
enough to establish his culpability in any absolute sense. Or so he 
hopes. Chubb, however, accurately foresees the future and warns Blunt 
that he will be scrutinized and analyzed with the same attention to detail 
that art works undergo. Even more insistently than Chubb is doing 
now, the world will demand answers from him, facts about himself, his 
associates, and the mysterious fifth man of the spy network. Blunt 
recognizes this inevitability and wistfully recalls how art became a 
haven for him while in the security service. “Only it’s not so safe 
now. Everybody’s into art” (76). He is still trying to find a refuge in 
art by claiming the same interpretive status which he himself grants to 
art works; but as he says, everybody’s into art, and their methods of
14
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interpetation will not accomodate him. Like Titian’s Triple Portrait, 
Blunt wants to remain “A whole gallery of possibilities” (76), an 
occasion of ongoing and perhaps never-ending interpretation rather than 
a simple and straightforward meaning that condemns as it explains.
Blunt may in fact be an enigma, and Bennett, at least, seems to 
think so. Unlike the brutal cynicism of political expediency which 
motivates the government that condemns them, Bennett sees the 
Cambridge spies as acting upon their “illusions” (13), their political 
idealism and integrity, however misplaced it may have been. The 
illusions of the 1930’s, however, gave way to the fetishes of the 1960’s 
because political commitment seldom accomodates personal happiness, 
a goal these men seek as ardently as anyone else. If, as Bennett says, 
more people are not traitors because there is no longer anyone 
satisfactory enough to betray one’s country to, it only indicates the 
pervasiveness of that lack which Hilary, Burgess, and Blunt felt, and the 
strength of the drive for compensation through fetishism.
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